The independent review of Auckland Council's response to the city's deadly floods has found it was not prepared, lacked leadership and communication, and did not support its residents in the first hours of the event.
The Auckland Anniversary Floods wreaked havoc through the city's streets, homes and businesses, and ultimately killed four people.
Two months on, the community is still rebuilding and the independent review of Auckland Council's immediate response to the floods has been released.
The review, led by former Police Commissioner Mike Bush, has made 17 recommendations for the council to implement and highlighted failures it found in the council's response.
As the rain battered the region at speed on the evening of January 27, Auckland Council emergency managers stood up an incident team at 4:30pm.
By 6:15pm, the incident team's first virtual meeting was over, and the report states "much of the damage was done".
At 7:32pm, Auckland Mayor Wayne Brown's office received a local state of emergency template which was printed and ready to be signed.
"The Mayor received further advice via a Teams call that commenced around 9:15pm, this time that a declaration was needed. A completed declaration template was emailed to the Mayor’s office at 9:05pm and signed by 9:27pm," the review said.
The Mayor then sent the signed declaration to the Public Information Manager (PIM) of Auckland Emergency Management (AEM) but was not posted until 10:17pm.
"We are confident that, once the Mayor was informed of the need for the declaration of emergency, he signed it immediately and returned it to officials," the review said.
"Thereafter, AEM PIM staff showed a lack of urgency, both in posting the notice publicly and in communicating it to elected members."
"Not prepared"
The review found Auckland Council's emergency management system was "not prepared" for an event of "this magnitude and speed".
It found gaps in the city's preparedness were known to Auckland Council decision-makers "but, at the time of this flood event, they remained works in progress".
At the "critical early stages" of the flooding, the review found relationships and communication protocols between key players including the Mayor, Chair of the Council's Civil Defence Emergency Management committee, chief executive and emergency staff were "not sufficiently inclusive".
It found senior leaders "underestimated" the importance of their visible leadership roles which had an "adverse impact on communication and public confidence".
And the Council's emergency management team "appeared to lack the command, crisis leadership skills and operational experience to deal" with the event, "particularly in driving mission clarity and tasking during the initial response".
The review said critical Council emergency management roles and delegation "were unclear" within Council and to partner agencies.
The deadly flooding event exposed weaknesses in the Council's emergency management systems, the review found.
"[This] slowed the response, reduced situational awareness and led to inadequate early intelligence to support public safety information and decision making."
It found supercity planning for emergencies appeared to have fed an optimistic bias that Auckland Council's size and systems "could handle anything".
"Rather than a model based on central planning and localised delivery, the Council's emergency response was premised largely on centralised coordination and delivery of response," the report said.
"In the event, this weakened the localised intelligence flows that could have supported better-targeted community responses."
"System failure"
The review said the list of issues created a "system failure", especially in the initial 12 hours of the Council's emergency management response.
"Aucklanders did not receive the timely communications, leadership, and practical support they had a right to expect in a crisis of this magnitude."
It found it "troubling" that many of the problems found were known in advance and weren't prioritised and actioned.
Full recommendations from the report
- That a separate review be undertaken to examine Auckland Emergency Management’s (AEM) prevention, preparedness and planning, (also referred to as Reduction and Readiness) for an emergency in Tamaki Makaurau and that this review be undertaken with urgency.
- Finalise with urgency the current review of the Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency Management (ACDEM) Group Plan.
- Include in the ACDEM Group Plan supporting plans for high priority hazards and events and detailed documentation of the Operating Model for emergency response.
- As recommended in the 2018 Smol Review, the CDEM Committee should agree a common approach for use of the CIMS system methodology as the basis for planning for response and implement each of the structured elements of the CIMS in any major response.
- In the context of the CIMS, revise and promulgate new Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for emergency response in Auckland, including specific SOPs for high priority hazards such as floods and superstorms.
- Guided by the CIMS, clarify and communicate the Auckland emergency management organisational structure including in particular the operational relationships between and respective accountabilities of the Group Controller, Deputy Controller, Director CDEM, General Manager Emergency Management, Director Governance, Chief Executive and the Mayor and Mayor’s Chief of Staff. Reflect these in updated policies and instruments of delegation.
- Ensure that AEM members, including the PIM team, have the resource, training and capability to exercise their function relating to internal and external communications.
- Establish a standard cadence for the CDEM Coordinating Executive Group (CEG) to provide reporting and advice to the Council’s CDEM committee in regard to progress made on implementing its decisions and overseeing the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the ACDEM Group Plan.
- Deliver a more frequent schedule of emergency management exercises, based on the CIMS and including complex scenarios, with multiple partner agencies, including CCOs and lifeline utilities. Involve the Office of the Mayor in these training events.
- Ensure all Auckland Council staff with dedicated emergency management accountabilities have expertise in and are qualified in both CIMS and crisis leadership protocols and principles.
- Consider changing organisational arrangements and reporting lines for the GM EM position and its reports, including the establishment of additional, qualified full time emergency response experts, including experts in public information.
- Develop a centralised approach to and system for intelligence capture and analysis, reflecting CIMS protocols, to ensure improved situational awareness in emergency response events.
- Revise SOPs to ensure that, while emergency response can be run remotely if required, the default preference is for a physical Emergency Operations Centre to support coordinated command and response.
- Ensure that the induction/onboarding process for a new Mayor and Mayoral Office staff includes advice and briefing materials on both the AEM system and how to inform, advise, and provide assurance during emergency response.
- Review, update, test and better communicate the database of prequalified CDCs and related logistics hubs and welfare arrangements. Ensure key partnering relationships, such as those with local marae and community providers, are explicit and proactively managed.
- Acquire or develop a common IT operating system for AEM and partner agencies to utilise during emergency response to facilitate sharing of intelligence and support improved real time communications and decision making.
- Establish and actively manage strong connectivity with critical external stakeholders, as required under the CIMS framework, including mana whenua, Pasifika, community groups, infrastructure providers, and lifeline utilities.
"I dropped the ball"
In a statement on Wednesday, Brown said he accepts the recommendations of the review and will work to implement them.
"The tragic events of January 27 have affected us all deeply. Four people lost their lives, and hundreds have lost their homes," Brown said.
"I have acknowledged that I dropped the ball that night – the communications weren’t fast enough, and I was too slow to be seen. I stand by my previous apology to Aucklanders."
Brown said he accepts he should have been more assertive in demanding information when it was thin.
"So that I could provide Aucklanders with public safety advice, practical support, and reassurance. I assumed that the systems were better than they were," Brown said.
"The preparation wasn't good enough – that's clear from the fact that some of the planned Civil Defence Centres flooded on the night which contributed to delays in establishing the sites. That just shouldn't happen, and we need to make sure we can set up those sites faster in future."
